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This study investigates the evolution of competition among commercial banks 
in Kenya with changes in the bank competitive landscape. Employing system 
GMM and the performance dynamics approach, the study establishes that bank 
consolidation has an inverted U effect on competition in the banking sector in 
Kenya, growth in technology spurs competition among commercial banks in 
the short run but is impotent in the long run and the progressive increase in 
the core capital requirement for commercial banks from KES250 million in 
2008 to KES1 billion in 2012 slowed competition in Kenya’s banking sector 
by 3.3 percentage points. Arising from the findings the study concludes that 
consolidation of commercial banks is a short to medium term instrument for 
promoting competition in the banking sector in Kenya, growth in technology is 
effective in promoting competition in Kenya’s banking sector in the short run 
rather than in the long run and blind increases in the core capital requirements 
can lead to undesired outcome of reduced competition in the banking sector in 
Kenya.
Keywords: Bank competitive landscape; Intermediation efficiency; Exceptional 
profits.
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1. Introduction
Competition among commercial banks in Kenya has been a core concern to the 
regulator, the central of Bank of Kenya (CBK), and policy makers. Competition 
in the banking sector is viewed as a solution to the perennial problem of 
intermediation inefficiency (Republic of Kenya, 2008). In Kenya, intermediation 
inefficiency has manifested in the form of high interest rate spreads and lending 
rates coupled by persistent exceptional bank profits.
The position held by the regulator and policy makers is theoretically sound. 
Economic theory posits that that in the long run, competition should be able to 
equalize returns to all economic activities through a dynamic process (Mueller, 
1977). Mueller’s (1977) starting point is in the short run and with a firm earning 
exceptional profits above or below the competitive norm. The competitive 
process begins with attraction of resources into activities earning more than 
the competitive norm and flow of resources from activities earning less than 
the competitive norm. In the long run, the flow of resources into and from an 
activity brings back profitability which is at the level of the competitive norm.
Applying these theoretical propositions to commercial banking, the 
underpinning argument is that intermediation inefficiency is a shortrun affair. 
With free entry and exit the phenomenon of exceptional bank profitability 
driven by high interest rates and wide interest rate spreads should be corrected 
in the longrun (Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan and Wilson, 2015). The dynamic 
process would go on until no new bank is enticed to join or exit the market.
Incumbents enjoying exceptional profits frustrate the dynamic process by 
erecting barriers to the competitive process. Those experiencing profitability less 
than the competitive norm enhance the process by adopting more competitive 
strategies in order to survive. On the other hand, regulators and policy makers 
implement institutional, legal and policy reforms to achieve intermediation 
efficiency. These counteracting measures by the market players alter the bank 
competitive landscape. It is the effect of these alterations in the bank competitive 
landscape on competition in the banking sector that is of interest in this study.
2. Bank competitive landscape in Kenya
The banking sector in Kenya comprises of the CBK, as the regulator, 43 
commercial banks, one mortgage finance company, eight representative offices 
of foreign banks, nine microfinance banks, two credit reference bureaus, 13 
money remittance providers and 87 foreign exchange bureaus (CBK, 2015). 
The commercial banks compete in terms of size and ownership.
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Between 2000 and 2015 there were three government owned banks, 27 
domestic privately owned banks and 13 foreign private banks (CBK, 2016). 
Therefore, banking in Kenya is dominated by domestic privately-owned banks 
in terms of numbers. The domestic privately-owned banks lead with a market 
share of 64 per cent, followed by foreign private banks at 31 per cent and finally 
the government owned banks at five per cent (CBK, 2015). Though this is the 
situation as at 2015, the market share fluctuated within the period 2000 to 2014. 
For instance, the market share of private foreign banks reduced considerably 
from 43 per cent in 2006 to 31 per cent in 2014 (CBK, 2007, 2015). That of 
government owned banks shrank marginally from 5.7 per cent in 2006 to 5 per 
cent in 2014. The shrinking in the market shares of the foreign privately owned 
and government banks was associated with an expansion in the market share 
for private domestically owned banks from 51.3 per cent in 2006 to 64 per cent 
in 2014. Therefore, competition among commercial banks is apparent in terms 
of ownership.
Based on size, commercial banks in Kenya are categorized in terms of the 
composite market share index (CMSI) (CBK, 2011). A bank with a CMSI of 
over five per cent is considered large, that with a CMSI between one per cent 
and five per cent is medium and those with a CMSI of less than one per cent are 
regarded as small. Arising from this classification, there were six large banks, 
15 medium sized banks and 23 small banks in 2010. These numbers remained 
constant till 2014 (CBK, 2015). On average, between the period 2010 and 2014 
53.3 per cent of the banking sector in Kenya was controlled by large sized banks. 
However, the market share of medium sized banks has gradually increased from 
34.5 per cent in 2010 to 41.7 per cent in 2014 whereas that of large sized banks 
has gradually declined from 56.1 per cent in 2010 to 49.9 per cent in 2014 
(CBK, 2011, 2015). Therefore, between the period 2010 to 2014, competition 
has intensified and the medium sized banks are gradually catching up with the 
large banks. The market share of small sized banks marginally declined from 
9.4 per cent in 2010 to 8.4 per cent in 2014 (CBK, 2011, 2015). This implies 
that though the small banks are the majority in terms of numbers in the banking 
sector, they do not pose much competition to the large and medium sized banks.
Overall, over the period 2000 and 2014 commercial banking has been 
dominated by domestic privately-owned banks in terms of ownership and large 
banks in terms of size. Therefore, it is expected that efforts to spur and derail 
competition in the banking sector would imply a wrestling (retention) of market 
share from the domestic private banks and large banks. It is the effects of the 
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tools (efforts) used to alter the bank competitive landscape on competition 
among commercial banks in Kenya that is of interest to this study.
3. Evolution of the bank competitive landscape in Kenya
Firms slow competition through blocking imitation, retarding or blocking 
entry and consolidation (Chronopoulos et al., 2015). The government on the 
other hand, slows or spurs competition through legal barriers (Goddard, Liu, 
Molyneux, and Wilson, 2011). This is no different in Kenya. Independently, 
commercial banks have been altering the bank competitive landscape through 
adoption of new technologies and financial innovations while the government 
has been achieving it through legal reforms.
Between 2000 and 2014 the notable legal reforms were motivated by the 
country’s economic blue print: The Kenya Vision 2030. The vision acknowledges 
that Kenya’s banking sector is highly segmented and dominated by a few large 
banks, resulting in reduced competition and high credit costs (Republic of 
Kenya, 2007). To spur competition the government intervened through creation 
of incentives for the small banks to consolidate. Consolidation of the small 
banks was meant to enhance their capacity to compete with large banks and 
enable them to reap economies of scale in their operations and thereby help in 
improving intermediation efficiency.
The first medium-term plan (2008-2012) of the Kenya Vision 2030 altered 
the bank competitive landscape through consolidation. The medium-term plan 
operationalized the desire to consolidate the banking sector by progressively 
enhancing the capital base from KES250 million in 2008 to KES1 billion by 
2012 (Republic of Kenya, 2008). To this end, the Banking Act (Cap 488) laws 
of Kenya was amended in 2008 (CBK, 2009). The amendment progressively 
increased the core capital requirement for commercial banks from KES250 
million in 2008 to KES1 billion in 2012. The rationale of the amendment was 
that high capital requirements would motivate the small banks to merge or seek 
other forms of consolidation. It was envisaged that the resulting banks from the 
mergers would be efficient due to economies of scale and enhanced capacity 
to compete with large banks. The upward revision of core capital to KES1 
billion triggered four mergers and acquisition between 2008 and 2014. The 
consolidation activities reduced the number of commercial banks from 45 in 
2008 to 43 in 2012 (CBK, 2009, 2013). Therefore, the enhancement of the core 
capital did not effectively address segmentation in the banking sector. Though, 
the segmentation reduced by a small margin it is important to establish the extent 
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to which consolidation influenced the level of competition among commercial 
banks since this was the primary objective of the intervention. Further, to judge 
on the effectiveness of the regulatory change it is significant to establish the 
effect of change in the core capital requirements on the level of competition.
To protect and improve their positions commercial banks have been 
leveraging on the technological developments by diversifying their products 
and improving on service delivery. The common forms of technology adopted 
by Kenyan commercial banks include Automated Teller Machines (ATM), bank 
websites, online bill payments, ATM cheques and cash deposits, branchless 
banking, mobile banking, credit and debit cards and internet banking (CBK, 
2014). The motivating factors for adoption of new technologies include 
extension of banking hours, improving service delivery, connecting customers to 
the bank system networks during and after working hours, branchless banking, 
decongesting banking halls and maintenance of big market shares. The most 
predominant form of technology used by commercial banks in Kenya is the 
automated teller machines (ATMs). The ATM system has evolved to become 
alternative delivery channel for services such as cash and cheques deposits and 
loan applications and processing. Between 2009 and 2014, the number of ATMs 
rapidly increased from 1,827 in 2009 to 2,613 in 2014 (CBK, 2015). The extent 
to which this unprecedented growth in the number of ATMs has increased or 
decreased competition among commercial banks is unclear. This study sought 
to empirically ascertain the effect.
Overall, therefore, this study sought to establish the effect of changes in the 
bank competitive landscape on competition among commercial banks in Kenya. 
Specifically, the study sought to establish the effect of changes in consolidation, 
technology and regulation (enhancement of the capital requirement) on 
competition among commercial banks in Kenya.
4. Literature review
4.1. Theoretical literature review 
To establish the effect of changes in the bank competitive landscape on 
competition among commercial banks, the level of competition in the 
banking sector must be established first. The measurement of competition is 
generally based on the neo-classical theory of markets. The theory argues that 
depending on a firm’s or buyer’s ability to influence price, markets can either be 
competitive, oligopolistic, monopolistic competition, monopsony or monopoly 
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(Varian, 2014). The two extreme cases in the continuum are perfect competition 
and monopoly. Under perfect competition neither the buyer nor seller (firm) 
has the ability to influence the price given quantity while under monopoly, the 
seller (firm) has absolute power to set the price given quantity. According to 
the neo-classical theory of markets, therefore, the measurement of competition 
is a measure of a firm’s power to influence price (Gudmundsson, Ngoka and 
Odongo, 2013).
Two approaches arise from the Neo-classical theory of markets on the 
measurement of the power of a firm to influence price. The performance dynamic 
approach (structure conduct and performance or the Schumpeterian view) and 
non-performance dynamics approach. The non-performance dynamics approach 
includes the Lerner Index (LI) and the Panzar and Rosse statistic (H statistic) 
(Elzinga and Mills, 2011; Panzar and Rosse, 1987) while the performance 
dynamics approach constitute the Muller’s approach (Mueller, 1977).
The performance dynamics approach is more relevant to the present study 
unlike the non-performance dynamics approach. The approach is due to Mueller 
(1977). The measurement of competition is conceptualized for markets with 
free entry and exit. Entry and exit are, in this context considered sufficient to 
bring profitability quickly in line with the competitive norm (Mueller, 1977). 
Mueller’s starting point is in the short run and with a firm earning exceptional 
profits above or below the competitive norm. According to Mueller (1977), the 
competitive process begins with attraction of resources into activities earning 
more than the competitive norm and flow of resources from activities earning 
less than the competitive norm. In the long run, the flow of resources into and 
from an activity brings back profitability to the competitive norm. When the 
competitive norm is achieved, no firm is enticed to enter or exit an activity 
(Mueller, 1977).
Pakes (1987) argues, however, that the competitive process is not sudden but 
smooth. Profits earned in a particular period provide resources to maintain profits 
into the future. This occurs as firms erect barriers to entry through alterations in 
the bank competitive landscape. Therefore, profits of all firms slowly converge 
to the competitive norm with the profitability at one point being directly related 
to its past profit values even extending the time span far into the past. As such, 
a firm’s evolution of profitability is a measure of competition in an industry 
(Mueller, 1977). The dependence of profits at one point on past values makes 
profitability a data generating process (Mueller, 1977). The process has memory 
and converges to a long run value overtime. Therefore, the profit data generating 
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process is a stationary autoregressive (AR) process. Formally, fi rm i’s profi t 
generating process is given by:
where:
eit is white noise error term, 
αi  is the permanent component of profi ts to the fi rm and 
λi  is the coeffi cient of profi tability in the previous period for the fi rm
The coeffi cient of profi tability in the previous period (λi) shows the proportion 
of profi ts in the previous period (t-1) that are retained in the current (t) period. 
This effectively makes this parameter of persistence the measure of competition 
(Cable and Jackson, 2008). Whatever is not retained is assumed to have been 
eroded by competition. If (λi) is close to one, profi ts persist and the level 
of competition is weak. When (λi) is close to zero profi ts do not persist and 
competition is high. The process in equation 1 is stationary since fi rms cannot 
fully retain all their previous period profi ts. Therefore |λi |<1.
Previous studies on the level of competition among fi rms using performance 
dynamics approach and relevant to this study include, Yurtoglu (2004) who 
studied the persistence of fi rm level profi tability in Turkey, Flamini, Schumacher 
and McDonald (2009), who studied the determinants of profi tability of 389 
commercial banks in 41 SSA countries, Goddard et al. (2011), who carried out 
a cross-country study on persistence of bank profi tability for a sample of 65 
countries from developing and developed countries for the period 1997 to 2007, 
and Chronopoulos et al. (2015), who studied the dynamics of bank profi tability 
in the US arising from regulatory changes during the period 1984-2010.
4.2. Empirical literature review
Yurtoglu (2004) studied the persistence of fi rm level profi tability in Turkey 
using 172 of the largest manufacturing fi rms. The study estimated the level of 
competition (profi t persistence) among the fi rms using Muller’s approach. To 
establish the effect of the changes in the bank competitive landscape on the level 
of competition, the study regressed the parameters of equation 1 against fi rm 
and industry wide covariates. Therefore, the study used a two-stage process. 
In the fi rst stage, the study estimated the parameters of equation 1 while in the 
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where:
IND is a vector of variables capturing industry and economy wide covariates, 
Xit  is a vector of firm characteristics
This approach is similar to that of Gschwandtner (2005), who studied profit 
persistence in the long run using 85 survivors and 72 non-survivor firms drawn 
from various industries in the US economy for the period 1950-1999, and 
Goddard et al. (2011), who carried out a cross country study on persistence of 
bank profitability for a sample of 65 countries from developing and developed 
countries. The approach treats the estimation of profit persistence as first stage 
and its determination as second stage. The present study follows the inclusion 
of firm and industry wide covariates such as market share, size of company 
assets, company growth rates and industry concentration in estimating the 
effect of changes in the bank competitive landscape on the level of competition 
among commercial banks in Kenya. However, the present study differs with the 
separation of the processes in two stages. The specification in equation 2 ignores 
the autoregressive nature of profits. It assumes that the profit data generating 
process acts independent of the control variables. A view that is against the 
performance dynamics approach (Pakes, 1987; Cable and Jackson, 2008).
Flamini et al. (2009) studied the determinants of profitability of 389 commercial 
banks in 41 SSA countries. Using Muller’s (1977) approach, this study sought 
to unravel why banks in SSA were more profitable than the rest of world yet the 
region posted weak economic performance. The study further sought to establish 
whether the high bank returns were a negative feature of financial intermediation 
in SSA countries. The study used regression analysis to investigate the impact 
of firm, industry and macroeconomic variables on bank returns using annual 
bank and macro level data. The firm characteristics included bank size, activity 
and diversification, and ownership structure. Industry characteristics comprised 
regulations and technological changes whereas the macroeconomic variables 
included inflation and income. Rather than estimate the level of persistence 
first, Flamini et al. (2009) included the control variables directly in equation 1. 
This approach differs with that of Yurtoglu (2004), Gschwandtner (2005) and 
Goddard et al. (2011). However, the approach is similar to that of Chronopoulos 
et al. (2015) who studied the dynamics of bank profitability in the US arising 
from regulatory changes during the period 1984 to 2010 and Eklund and Desai 
(2013) who carried out a cross country study on the effects of entry regulations 
on competitive markets and the speed of elimination of abnormal profits for 59 
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countries during the period 1998-2011. Flamini et al. (2009), Chronopoulos et 
al. (2015) and Eklund and Desai (2013) augmented static determinants of bank 
profi tability as control variables in equation 1. These studies used the bank and 
industry level covariates used by Flamini et al. (2009) with the addition of bank 
risks exposures, liquidity, bank capital and concentration using the Herfi ndahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI). Therefore Flamini et al. (2009), Chronopoulos et al. 
(2015) and Eklund and Desai (2013) used the following specifi cation:
where:
BR is a vector of variables capturing regulatory change,
IND  is a vector of variables capturing industry and economy wide covariates, 
Xit   is a vector of bank characteristics and
γi  is an Individual bank effects which could be random or fi xed
The present study adopts the specifi cation in equation 3. This specifi cation 
treats the profi t generating process as an autoregressive process and prevents 
any bias resulting from the omission of control variables in equation 1. In 
addition, the approach augments the two stages of persistence and determinants 
of persistence. A scenario that best describes the real situation in various 
contestable markets. Importantly, the specifi cation assumes that regulatory 
changes, BR, do not directly affect a bank’s profi tability. Rather regulation acts 
through retention of previous period profi ts. Therefore, to capture the impact of 
regulatory change, this approach introduces dummies and interacts them with 
the lagged value of profi ts.
Though the present study borrows model specifi cation and some covariates 
from the mentioned studies, it differs from them on two accounts. First, 
unlike Yurtoglu (2004), Gschwandtner (2005), Eklund and Desai (2013) and 
Chronopoulos et al. (2015), the present study establishes the effects of changes 
in the bank competitive landscape on competition in the banking sector in a 
developing rather than a developed country setup. Second, unlike the cross-
country study by Flamini et al. (2009) the present study is country-specifi c. 
Cross-country studies have a weakness that strong conclusions or policy 
recommendations cannot be arrived at. Therefore, this study presents a case 
specifi c to Kenya or a developing country that can be used to make strong 
conclusions and policy recommendations.
(3)
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5. The empirical approach
5.1. The models
The objectives of this study are three-fold but achieved using the following two 
models. The model follows the performance dynamics approach used by Flamini 
et al. (2009), Chronopoulos et al. (2015) and Eklund and Desai (2013). Model 3 
is extended as shown in model 4.
where:
INDt is an industry wide vector of variables comprising of economic growth, 
technological change, infl ation and consolidation.
Xit is a vector of bank specifi c covariates which comprise of bank risk 
exposures, bank size, diversifi cation, bank capital, bank ownership structure 
and liquidity. 
θi is individual bank specifi c effects which could be random or fi xed.
Unlike equation 1 and 3 equation 4 is generalized up to jth lag following Cable 
and Jackson (2008) who proposed the use of an appropriate lag length. Further, 
equation 4 assumes an industry view by making the permanent component of 
profi ts, β, bank invariant.
The inclusion of lags of profi tability on the right-hand side of equation 4 
makes it a shortrun equation.1  Therefore, equation 4 gives the shortrun effect of 
consolidation, growth in technology and regulation. To obtain the long run effect 
of consolidation and growth in technology2 the following model is estimated.
Equation 5 drops the dynamic component making it the long run model. To 
capture the effect of consolidation and growth in technology the short run and 
the long run coeffi cients from model 4 and 5 are interpreted. To capture the effect 
of the enhancement of the core capital requirement the coeffi cient of interest in 
equation 4 is  (λ j + β jBRj )
j=1
p
∑ . When the regulation is in force BRj is equal to one. 






∑  . To get the effect of the 
body of regulations on bank profi tability the signage of             was considered. If 
(4)
(5)
1 partial adjustment processes only occur in the short run (Verbeek, 2008)
2 regulations act through the dynamic component and, therefore, their effect can only be 
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the overall effect is negative, then BR would have enhanced competition. If the 
sign is positive the regulation will have reduced competition.
5.2. Models diagnostics
Equation 4 is a linear dynamic panel data model since it includes the lags of the 
dependent variable on the right-hand side. This affected the estimation method 
as well as the diagnostic tests conducted. The presence of the lagged profits 
on the right-hand side of equation 4 causes endogeneity problems. As such, 
ordinary panel data estimation methods such as pooled ordinary least squares 
(POLS), random effects and fixed effects model yield inconsistent estimates 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). To address the problem, the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) was used. The GMM estimator reduces potential bias and 
asymptotic imprecisions (Arioglu and Tuan, 2014). As such, equation 4 was 
estimated using GMM. Equation 5 is a static panel model. This means that it 
can be estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) models 
depending on the assumption on the one-way error component (Baltagi, 2008). 
To discriminate between the FE and RE models the Hausman test was used.
To test the precision of the GMM estimates, the results were compared with 
those of Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and FE. The GMM estimate 
of the coefficient of lagged dependent variable lies between that POLS and FE 
(Roodman, 2006). The POLS estimate biases the estimate upwards whereas 
the fixed effect estimate biases the estimate downwards (Roodman, 2006). For 
precision of the estimates in the study, the coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variable were considered admissible if they lay between the dynamic fixed effects 
estimates and naive OLS estimates. Further, due to the GMM specification, 
relevant tests on the specification of the process were conducted. Specifically, 
over identification restrictions and validity of instruments tests were conducted 
using Hansen test as put forth by Roodman (2006).
The dependent variable and the lagged dependent variables in equations 4 
and 5 are normalized. The normalization does away with macroeconomic cycles 
and, therefore, most studies on persistence of profits and competition report 
stationarity (Crespo Cuaresma and Gschwandtner, 2006).3   This fact was further 
supported by the case of large individuals (N) than time period (T). However, 
there is limited literature defining ‘large’ and ‘small’ T. Samples with a less than 
3 Non-stationarity would imply that exceptional profits persist unduly. A fact inconsistent with 
theory and expectations.
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10 years or waves are classified as micro while those with a more than 20 years 
or waves are classified as macro (Blackburne and Frank, 2007). This leaves 
studies with 10 < T < 20 in a tepid situation. The present study had 14 years and, 
therefore, in the inconclusive situation. To authoritatively use the dynamic panel 
approach, the study had to verify and confirm the level of stationarity of the ratio 
scaled variables used.
The use of GMM in estimation of linear dynamic models such as 4 is 
anchored on the assumption of first order serial correlation in the error term only 
(Roodman, 2006). The GMM permits instruments from the second lag of the 
dependent variable if the assumption of first order serial correlation only holds 
(Roodman, 2006). Therefore, higher order serial correlation invalidates the use 
of instruments Baltagi (2008). As such, a test for first order and higher orders 
of serial correlation is both a test for autocorrelation and specification. For 
application of GMM, first order serial correlation should be present and second 
order serial correlation onwards absent in the error terms Roodman (2006).
To test for autocorrelation, and therefore, specification, Arrellano and Bond 
(1991) test of first and second order serial correlation was used. To arrive at 
the correct specification, deeper lags of the dynamic component of model 4 
were explored with a starting point of an AR(1) process. The optimal lag length 
of the AR(p) process was obtained when the assumption of presence of first 
order serial correlation and absence of second order serial correlation or any 
other higher order serial correlation held. Further, all the lags admissible under 
this assumption had to be statistically significant (Roodman, 2006). The use of 
GMM is based on moment conditions (Roodman, 2006). The moment conditions 
proliferate with the number of instruments used. This can sometimes cause 
imprecision in estimation (Roodman, 2006). As such, the study tested whether 
the moment conditions established by a particular number of instruments were 
over identified. Hansen test for over identifying restrictions was used.
5.3. The data and definition ovariables
The study used published panel data for 36 commercial banks that continually 
existed during the period 2001 to 2014. Data on bank size, asset growth, bank 
risks exposures, diversification, liquidity, bank capital, ownership structure, 
technological change and regulations was obtained from bank supervision annual 
reports from the CBK as well as published financial statements from individual 
commercial banks. Data on inflation and economic growth was obtained from 
statistical abstracts published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). 
The variables were measured and defined as shown in Table 1.
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table 1: defInItIon and measurement of varIables
Variable Definition Measurement
Profits, πit ~  Returns on Assets (ROA) of bank i  in 
year t   
Percentage normalized annual 
returns on assets  
Industry Characteristics (INDt )
Economic Growth, 
(EG)
Is the percentage change in national 
income in a given year 
Percentage change in national 
income
Concentration, (HHI) A measure of the degree of concentration 
in the banking industry. 
Sum of the squares of each bank’s 
market shares of each year
Technological change,   
(TC)
Growth in the number of ATMs Percentage change in the number 
of ATMs
Inflation  (INF) The continuous rise of the general price 
level of goods and services. 
Percentage change in the general 
price level of goods and services
Firm Characteristics (XIt )
Bank size, (BS) The total assets of bank i  at time t The total assets of bank i  in 
period t in Kenya Shillings
Bank risk exposures, 
(BRE)
Banks’ exposure to credit risk The ratio of net charge offs to 
gross loans in percentage form
Diversification, (D) A banks dependence on other sources of 
income rather than the core business of 
lending 
The ratio of non-interest income 
to total operating income in 
percentage form




A dummy variable that shows ownership 
structure of a bank with reference catego-
ry of domestic ownership. 
Takes a value of 1 if more than 
50% of a bank’s shareholding is 
foreign and zero otherwise
Liquidity, (L) The liquidity and lending specialization 
of a bank 





A dummy variable showing the amend-
ment of the Banking Act (Cap 488) that 
increased the core capital requirement for 
commercial banks from KES250 million 
in 2008 to KES1 billion in 2012. 
Sets to one when the regulation is 
in force and zero otherwise
6. Results
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table 2: overall summary statIstICs of ratIo sCaled varIables
Variables Unit of 
Measurement
 N=nxT Mean SD Min Max
Bank Size KES mn 504 32,594 53,779 502.3 383,038
ROA Percentage 504 2.81 2.151 -6.5 9.5
Normalized 
ROA
Percentage 504 0.318 1.219 -4.64 6.82
Bank Risk 
Exposures
Percentage 504 10.21 12.15 0.1 77.1
Diversification Percentage 504 16.03 10.11 0 58.81
Bank Capital Percentage 504 16.87 9.521 5.6 76.51
Liquidity percentage 504 59.51 22.154 19.77 185.73
Economic 
Growth




Sum of squared 
market share
N/A 0.071 0.01 0.059 0.092
Number of 
ATMs
Count numbers N/A 1287.85 949.56 166 2613
Inflation Percentage N/A 8.1 3.959 2 15.1
Table 2 shows that the mean bank size for the pooled data is KES32.6 billion 
with the smallest and largest banks for the entire period having net assets worth 
KES502.3 million and KES383 billion, respectively. Therefore, in terms of size, 
as proxied by net assets the sample had markedly dissimilar commercial banks, 
a fact that is consistent with the population under study. The ROA for the sample 
over the period 2001 to 2014 was on average 2.81 per cent. When the period 
was considered as a whole, ROA ranged from -6.5 per cent to 9.5 per cent with 
the observations approximately 2.151 standard deviation units from each other. 
Thus, the sample obeys the criterion for diminishing outliers in the data adopted 
by the study.
The summary statistics presented in Table 2 further show that on average, 
pooled bank risk exposures series had a mean of credit risk up to 10.21 per 
cent. However, the risk exposure varied over the period from 0.1 per cent to 
77.1 per cent with a standard deviation of 12.15. Therefore, irrespective of the 
bank and time, the levels of risk exposures have a vast spread for the sample 
over the period 2001 to 2014 with the observations approximately 12.15 
standard deviation units from each other. With regards to diversification, the 
data presentation in Table 2 shows that the pooled data for diversification had 
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a mean of 16.03 per cent and a standard deviation of 10.11 with a range from 
zero to 58.81 per cent. Therefore, over the period, some banks concentrated on 
core business of lending money while others supplemented their interest income 
with non-interest income.
Further, the data summarized in Table 2 shows that pooled bank capital series 
had a mean of 16.87 per cent and a standard deviation of 9.521, with a range 
from 5.6 per cent to 76.51 per cent. This means that over the period 2001 to 
2014, the assets that shareholders had a residual claim on were on average 16.87 
percent and had a spread of 70.91 per cent. Finally, Table 2 shows that the 
mean outstanding loan to net assets ratio was 59.51 per cent with a standard 
deviation of 22.15 and a spread from 19.77 per cent to 185.73 per cent. On 
average, therefore, over the period 2001 to 2014, commercial banks’ lending 
did not exceed their net assets. Since the ratio of outstanding loans to net assets 
was a proxy of liquidity risk, the fact that commercial banks’ lending did not 
exceed their net assets implies that over the period of analysis liquidity risk was 
moderate. As such, commercial banks could have met a sudden liquidity need 
through a fire up sale of assets.
Table 2 shows that the average economic growth for the period 2001 to 2014 
was 4.24 per cent, with a standard deviation of 1.062 per cent. The minimum 
growth rate over the period of analysis was 2.5 per cent while the maximum 
was 6.1 per cent. Therefore, the economic growth over the study period was 
moderate presenting the commercial banks with a moderate room for growth. 
The summary statistics in Table 3 also shows that on average the banking sector 
had a concentration of 0.071. This figure is slightly greater than zero and by 
far less than one. Therefore, the banking sector was characterized by a large 
number of commercial banks over the study period. The maximum value and 
the minimum value of commercial bank concentration were 0.09 and 0.06, 
respectively. Thus, the spread of bank concentration over the period was 0.03, 
revealing that the number of banks in the banking sector in Kenya had no 
substantial changes over the period 2001 to 2014.
6.2. Diagnostic tests
6.2.1. Stationarity tests
The study used a dynamic panel estimation approach that assumes that the 
variables are stationary. The study tested this assumption for both bank 
characteristics and industry characteristics. The tests were individual and 
common for bank characteristics and individual for industry wide characteristics. 
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Im, Pesaran and shin, ADF-Fisher chi-square and PP-Fisher chi-square tests 
were used to test the null hypothesis to ensure that the conclusions arrived at 
were robust. Table 3 presents a summary of the findings.
table 3: statIonarIty test results
Common Unit Root Test Individual Tests








-8.520*** -4.611*** 137.877*** 329.520***







Inflation -3.323*** 117.737*** 277.223***
Bank Size -4.731*** -3.892*** 123.346*** 303.701***
Bank risk 
Exposures
-8.366*** -4.373*** 135.634*** 291.233***
Diversification -10.234*** -5.513*** 159.288*** 358.680***
Bank capital -2.810*** -3.644*** 123.913*** 305.096***
Liquidity -8.739*** -7.748*** 192.790*** 318.678***
Note: ***P-value less than 0.01
Table 3 shows the summary of the findings on stationarity. All the tests 
have a null hypothesis of presence of a unit root. Therefore, a rejection of null 
hypothesis would imply that the series in question was stationary. Table 3 shows 
that the test statistics for testing the null (presence of the unit root) against the 
alternative (stationarity) for bank covariates had p-value less than 0.01. The test 
statistics are greater than the critical values for all the covariates at one per cent 
level of significance, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis. This finding 
is consistent for all the tests and, therefore, robust. Thus, each bank covariate is 
stationary per bank and as a pooled sample series.
With respect to industry wide covariates, Table 3 shows that the test statistics 
have p-values less 0.01 for all tests and, therefore, greater than the critical 
values at one per cent level of significance. Thus, all the unit root tests reject 
the null hypothesis of a unit root making this finding robust. Thus, the industry 
wide covariates are stationary for the period 2001 to 2014.The stationarity of 
bank and the industry wide characteristics satisfies the inherent assumption of 
stationarity required by micro-panels. Therefore, the study can safely apply the 
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generalized method of moments (GMM) in the estimating models without the 
fear of spurious results.
table 4: determInatIon of optImal lags of normalIzed return on assets 
VARIABLES AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4)
































































































































AB test for AR(1) in first differences






















Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
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Table 4 shows the introduction of the first to the fourth lags of normalized return 
on assets in model 4. The estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable 
lie between those of the fixed effects and nave OLS for all the models. However, 
not all the versions satisfy the Arrellano and Bond test of autocorrelation. For the 
AR(1) and AR(2) model, the null hypothesis that the error term has no first order 
and second order serial correlation is rejected. For the AR(3) the null hypothesis 
is rejected for the first differences but not rejected for the second differences. 
The AR(4) model fails to reject the null hypothesis for both the first and second 
order serial correlation. Estimation of dynamic panel data models using GMM is 
anchored on the assumption of first order serial correlation in the error term and 
no higher order serial correlation say of order two Roodman (2006). Therefore, 
based on the Arellano and Bond test of autocorrelation, the AR version of the 
estimating models that best fit these assumptions is AR(3). In addition, Table 4 
shows that the lag preceding an insignificant lag of normalized return on assets 
is the third lag since the coefficient of the fourth lag of normalized return on 
assets is insignificant. Therefore, the study adopted an AR(3) framework.
6.2.3. Choice of the number of instruments
To select the number of instruments in the optimal AR structure a sensitivity 
analysis ranging from severe, moderate to no restrictions of instruments 
was carried out. The most severe restriction for the AR(3) framework of the 
estimating models was the use of first lag only. The no restriction was the use of 
the first to the 13th lag since the study had 14 years (time periods). Table 5 shows 
the results of the sensitivity analysis. Table 5 shows that the lags of instruments 
used, notwithstanding the satisfaction of bounds, holds and first but not second 
order serial correlation is present in the error term. For instance, the AB test for 
AR(1)for lag(1 1), lag(1 2), lag(1 3), lag(1 7) and lag(1 13) has corresponding 
P-values of 0.031, 0.021, 0.016, 0.014 and 0.013 respectively. The P-values 
are all less than 0.05, therefore, at five per cent level of significance the null 
hypothesis of no first order serial correlation is rejected at five per cent level 
of significance. In addition, the AB test for AR(2)  for lag(1 1), lag(1 2), lag(1 
3), lag(1 7) and lag(1 13) has corresponding P-values of 0.214, 0.199, 0.183, 
0.168 and 0.167 respectively. The P-values are all greater than 0.05, therefore, 
at five per cent level of significance the null hypothesis of no second order serial 
correlation is not rejected at five per cent level of significance. Therefore, the 
assumptions for the application of GMM holds for the AR(3) specification of the 
estimating models, no matter the lags of instruments used. This further supports 
the fitness of the AR(3) framework on the data.
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Table 5 shows that the severely restricted number of instruments was 53 
while the unrestricted number of instruments was 98. When the instruments are 
allowed to proliferate from 53 to 98, the coefficients of the first to the third lag 
increase from 2.125, -1.637 and 0.444 to 2.245, -1.793 and 0.502, respectively. 
Therefore, the coefficients are marginally rather than excessively sensitive 
to the number of instruments used. This supports the parsimonious nature of 
the AR(3) specification. Further, when the instruments proliferate, the Hansen 
P-value increases from 0.830 to a perfect value of one. Thus, an increase in the 
number of instruments from 53 to 98 leads to a strong failure of rejecting the 
null hypothesis of the Hansen test that the over-identifying restrictions hold.
Table 5 further shows that when the number of instruments multiplies from 
53 to 98, the number of variables explaining variation in profitability other than 
the lagged dependent variables increases from four to six at the count of 62 
instruments and finally to four at the count of 98 instruments. Thus, proliferation 
of instruments has an inverted U effect on the explanatory powers of variables 
with the maximum being at 62.
Thus, based on the facts that proliferation of instruments increases the 
coefficient of the three lags of normalized return on assets marginally and 
explanatory power of other independent variables reaches its peak at 62 
instruments. The present study chose to use the first and second lags lag(1 2) of 
the dependent variables as instruments as well as the other exogenous variables 
(firm and industry wide covariates).
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table 5: determInatIon of optImal number of Instruments 
ARIABLES Lag(1 1) Lag(1 2) Lag(1 3) Lag(1 7) Lag(1 13)









































































































































































AB test for AR(1) in first 
differences















































Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
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6.2.4. Hausman test
To determine whether the fixed or random effects estimates of the static model 
5 should be interpreted, Hausman test was used and the chi statistic reported in 
Table 6. The results presented in Table 6 show that the Hausman Chi-statistic 
is 18.22 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0327. Thus, the Chi statistic is 
greater than the tabulated value at five per cent level of significance. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of no systematic difference between the estimates of the 
random effects model and fixed effects model is rejected at five per cent level 
of significance. Thus, the Fixed Effects model should be interpreted as the long 
run (static) model.
6.3. The effect of changes in the bank competitive landscape on competition in 
the banking sector
To establish the effect of changes in the bank competitive landscape on 
competition in the banking sector in Kenya, an AR(3) variant of model 4 and 
the fixed effect variant of model 5 were estimated. Table 6 reports the findings.
6.3.1. Effect of change in consolidation
To examine the effect of consolidation on competition among commercial banks 
in Kenya the coefficient of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was interpreted. Table 
6 shows that in the short run the coefficient of Bank concentration in the efficient 
GMM specification is -80.10 with a corresponding p-value less than 0.01 in 
the short run model. Thus, the coefficient was significantly different from zero 
at one per cent level of significance. The coefficient was negative indicating 
that an increase in concentration in the short run reduces bank profitability, 
and therefore increase competition among commercial banks. Therefore, in the 
short run, market led movement from a huge number of very small banks to 
a single large bank slows persistence of bank profits and therefore, increases 
competition among commercial banks holding other factors constant. 
Table 6 further shows that in the long run the coefficient of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index in the fixed effects variant of the long run models is 31.46 with 
a corresponding p-value less than 0.05. Thus, the coefficient was significantly 
different from zero at five per cent level of significance. Thus, an increase in 
concentration in the long run increases bank profitability and slows competition 
in the banking sector. Therefore, in the long run, prolonged consolidation would 
enhance persistence of bank profitability and slow competition in the banking 
sector holding other factors constant.
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table 6: effeCt of Changes In the bank CompetItIve landsCape on CompetItIon In the 
bankIng seCtor In kenya
VARIABLES Fixed effects System 
GMM
Naïve OLS Fixed Effects Random 
Effects
1st Lag of Normalized 







2nd Lag of Normalized 







3rd Lag of Normalized 


























































































































































Hausman Chi    18.22***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The finding that consolidation reduces persistence of profitability in the short 
run but not in the long run is consistent with theory and expectations. According 
to the neoclassical theory of markets, a move from very many small firms to 
few large firms increases competition and slows persistence of profitability but 
a movement from many small firms to one large firm increases persistence of 
profitability and slows competition (Varian, 2014).
The fact that consolidation reduces persistence of profitability and increases 
competition in the short run but does otherwise in the long run implies that 
consolidation has an inverted U effect. The finding points to an optimal level 
of consolidation beyond which profits persist and competition is reduced. 
This is consistent with the findings by Chronopoulos et al. (2015) who found 
that increased industry concentration leads to reduced profitability in the 
US banking sector in the short run. However, the results contradict those of 
Flamini et al. (2009) who established that market concentration has no direct 
effect on bank profitability for commercial banks in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
contradiction may be explained by the different measures of concentration used 
by the studies. The present study used HHI while Flamini et al. (2009) used of 
overhead costs on bank profitability. In addition, Flamini et al. (2009) expected 
that market concentration would enter the regression significantly and with a 
negative sign just as is the case with the present study. Therefore, the finding 
that consolidation reduces persistence of profitability and increases competition 
in the short run but does otherwise in the long run is consistent with both theory 
and empirical literature.
6.3.2. Effect of change in technology
The results presented in Table 6 show that in the short run the coefficient of 
the log of the number of ATMs, shown as Growth in technology in the efficient 
GMM model is -0.937 with a corresponding p-value of less than 0.01. Therefore, 
the coefficient is significantly different from zero at one per cent. Since the 
number of ATMs enters model 4 in log form and normalized return on assets is 
in percentage form, the coefficient of the number of ATMs can be interpreted 
as an elasticity. Thus, other things being equal and in the short run a one per 
cent increase in the level of technology in the banking sector in Kenya reduces 
bank profitability by 0.937. Accordingly, in the short run, growth in technology 
increases competition holding other factors constant.
The finding that increase in level of technology increases competition and 
thereby reduces persistence of profits is consistent with theory and expectations. 
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According to the neo-classical theory of markets, a perfectly competitive 
market sells a homogeneous product and, therefore, consumers will purchase 
the product from sellers who quote the least price (Varian, 2014). In Kenya, 
technology makes the products offered by commercial banks to be similar and 
easily imitable (CBK, 2014). Thus, commercial banks in Kenya compete in 
terms of prices to attract customers. This leads to price reductions and subsequent 
reduction in profits and increased rivalry (competition) among them. Equity 
Bank, for example, is credited for the onset of mobile banking due to their 
innovative partnership with Safaricom in May 2010 (CBK, 2011). However, the 
product was quickly replicated by Family Bank in June 2010 as ’Pesa Pap’ and 
in 2014 copied by Kenya Commercial Bank and Commercial Bank of Africa 
through their partnerships with Safaricom (CBK, 2015).
Table 6 shows that the coefficient of log of the number of ATMs in the fixed 
effects variant of the static model, long run model, is -0.663 with a corresponding 
p-value greater than 0.05. Thus, the coefficient was not statistically different from 
zero at five per cent level of significance. Therefore, in the long run, changes 
in technology do not influence the level of profitability. This means that growth 
in technology neither slows persistence of profits nor increases competition in 
the long run. This finding is consistent with theory and a priori expectations. 
According to neo-classical theory of production, in the short run some factors of 
production are usually fixed (Varian, 2014). However, in the long run firms are 
able to vary the level of employment of all factors of production.
In the short run, not all commercial banks are able to adopt new technologies. 
However, in the long run all commercial banks are able to catch up with the 
frontiers of commercial banking in the industry making such technologies 
a common way of service provision. The banking sector in Kenya saw first 
movers adopt ATMs in early 2000 (CBK, 2001). However, by 2014, the use of 
ATMs was a conventional service delivery channel for all the commercial Banks 
in Kenya (CBK, 2015). Due to conventional nature of technology in the long 
run, it cannot help an institution gain new customers or rival its competitors. 
Therefore, changes in technology have effect on competition in the banking 
sector in the short run rather than in the long run.
The finding that technology reduces profitability, and therefore, enhance 
competition in the banking industry in Kenya is contrary to those of Holden and 
El-Bannany (2004) who established that an increase in the number of ATMs 
positively affected bank profitability in the UK through several factors such as 
reducing the labour costs and transactions costs. This may be explained by the 
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different set ups in which the studies are conducted. Holden and El-Bannany 
(2004) conduct their study in a developed world setting whereas the current 
study is conducted in a developing country environment. This emphasizes the 
country specific nature of the determinants of bank profitability and competition.
6.3.3. Effect of change in regulation
The measure of the body of regulation indicates the amendment of the Banking 
Act (Cap 488) that progressively increased the core capital requirement for 
commercial banks from KES250 million in 2008 to KES1 billion in 2012. 
The signage of the sum of the coefficients of interaction terms between body 
of regulations and the lags of normalized return on assets indicate the effect 
of amendment of the Banking Act (Cap 488) that increased the core capital 
requirement for commercial banks.
Table 6 shows that the coefficients of the interactions of body of regulations 
and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd lags of normalized return on assets in the efficient 
GMM model are 0.36, -0.60 and 0.28, respectively with corresponding p-values 
less than 0.01. Therefore, the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 
one per cent level of significance. The signage of the coefficients of interactions 
reinforces that of the first, second and third lag of profitability. Their sum is 0.03. 
The signage of the sum was positive reinforcing the level of profit persistence 
(0.95). Therefore, the progressive increase in core capital requirement from 
KES250 million in 2008 to KES1 billion enhanced persistence of bank 
profitability and therefore, reduced competition in the banking sector in Kenya.
This finding is consistent with theory and empirical findings by Chronopoulos 
et al. (2015). The progressive increase in core capital requirement can be seen as 
an erection of barrier to entry. According to the neoclassical theory of markets, 
a market structure without free entry and exit experiences persistence of profits 
and less competition (Varian, 2014). In addition, the increase in the core capital 
requirements may have triggered forceful consolidations that were predatory 
rather than non-exploitative. This is so since the coefficient of consolidation in 
the estimating equations is negative in the short run. This implies that market 
led consolidations are more beneficial than regulatory induced ones. Regulatory 
induced consolidation does not always occasion mergers and acquisition 
between small banks only. Large banks prey on small banks due to compliance 
deadlines leading to undesired outcomes. After the progressive increase in 
core capital requirement from KES250 million in 2008 to KES1 billion, for 
example, Savings and Loans limited, a small bank, merged with a large bank, 
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Kenya Commercial Bank. This outcome was not anticipated. Due to erection 
of barriers to entry and exit as well as predatory mergers and acquisitions, the 
progressive increase in core capital requirement increased slowed competition 
in the banking industry in Kenya. 
6.3.4.  A note on the control variable and alternative estimation models
On the control variables, Table 6 shows that economic growth and inflation enter 
the efficient system GMM estimation positively and significantly. However, the 
fixed effects model shows that the variables enter the long run relationship in 
a counteracting but insignificant manner. The fact that economic growth and 
inflation enter the model significantly in the shortrun rather than in the long 
run implies that variations in the macroeconomic environment affect bank 
profitability in the short run rather than in the longrun in Kenya. This finding is 
synonymous with the macroeconomic view of neutrality of firm level activities 
to changes in macro variables in the longrun. 
With respect to firm level variables, all the covariates, with the exception 
of diversification and structure of bank ownership, enter the shortrun model 
insignificantly but significantly in the longrun. This implies that firm level 
characteristics are important in explaining bank profitability in the longrun 
rather than in the shortrun. Bank size has a positive sign while bank size squared 
has a negative effect. This means that size promotes bank profitability up to 
some point beyond which profitability declines. This finding is similar to that of 
Flamini et al. (2009) and Chronopoulos et al. (2015). Bank capital (Equity⁄(Total 
Assets)) enters the model positively meaning that the more a bank finances its 
loan book the higher its profitability. On the contrary, an increase in bank risk 
exposures ((Net charge offs)⁄(Gross loans)) reduce the profitability of the banks. 
This is expected since an increase in bank risk exposures imply a deteriorating 
loan book that negatively impacts bank profitability.    
7. Conclusion
The study findings led to three key conclusions. First, premised on the finding of 
a negative effect on bank profitability in the short run and a positive effect in the 
long run, the study concludes that bank consolidation has an inverted U effect 
on competition in the banking sector. Consequently, a movement from very 
many small firms to a few large firms up to some point increases competition. 
Beyond this point, consolidation reduces competition among commercial banks 
in Kenya.
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Second, based on the finding that growth in technology reduces bank 
profitability in the short run and not in the long run, the study concludes that 
growth in technology slows persistence of profits and increases competition in 
the banking sector in short run. Moreover, the study concludes that in the long 
run growth in technology is impotent on competition in the banking sector.
Third, based on the finding that interactions of body of regulations and the 
lags of profitability enhances the influence of the lags of profitability on ‘todays’ 
profitability, the study concludes that contrary to expectation, the progressive 
increase in the core capital requirement for commercial banks slowed competition 
in the banking sector.
The conclusions by the study imply the following: First, the study found 
that bank consolidation has an inverted U effect on competition in the banking 
sector. This implies that consolidation is effective in promoting competition and 
slowing persistence of exceptional bank profitability up to some point. Further, 
the finding implies that consolidation is a short to medium term instrument 
for promoting competition in the banking sector. The government, therefore, 
should not over use consolidation beyond the optimal level. This optimal 
level as established by the study lies between one large bank and many small 
banks. This implies few large banks are good for competition and reduction of 
exceptional bank profitability. To the government, therefore, consolidation is 
a short to medium term tool of rectifying market inefficiency by reducing the 
number of commercial banks from many small sized banks to few large banks. 
Equally, to promote a banking sector that has no interest driven exceptional 
profitability commercial banks should not engage in anti-competition mergers 
that would create one large bank. This intervention is opposite of what theory 
suggests. Economic theory suggests that a market should have many players 
such that none can influence price. However, the finding that consolidation 
has an inverted U effect on persistence of exceptional bank profitability and 
competition in the banking sector, shows that competition in the banking sector 
is not dependent on bank numbers but also the size of the banks. The larger a 
bank the better the competition but up to some point.
Second, the study found that growth in technology increases competition in 
the banking sector in short run but not in the long run. Therefore, as tool to 
promote competition, growth in technology is effective in the short run rather 
than in the long run. In Kenya, large sized banks control over 80 per cent of 
the ATMs and mobile banking in the country (CBK, 2015). Therefore, small 
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sized banks control a paltry 20 per cent of the ATMs network and some are 
yet to adopt mobile banking. Therefore, as a short term measure to promote 
competition and reduce exceptional bank profitability, small sized commercial 
banks should swiftly adopt technology in form of ATMs and mobile banking to 
rival market share from their large peers. In addition, the government through 
the central bank should facilitate adoption of technology by the small banks. 
This would promote the rivalry that small sized banks exert to the large banks 
in the short run.
Third, the study found that contrary to expectation, the progressive increase 
in the core capital requirement for commercial banks increased persistence of 
bank profitability and slowed competition in the banking sector. This implies 
that though an increase in core capital requirements is a trigger for consolidation 
it can lead to undesired outcomes. In other words, an increase in core capital 
requirements can lead to the exact opposite of the desired outcomes based 
on how a regulation is structured. Whenever core capital requirements are 
increased, it is easily assumed that the regulation would trigger consolidation 
among the small sized banks. However, this is not always the case. Therefore, 
the government and the Central Bank should desist from blind increases in 
the core capital requirement for commercial banks. The regulations should 
be structured to incentivize consolidation and acquisitions among target tiers 
but not all the tiers. Therefore, as an alternative to core capital increment the 
government could carry out the following consolidation policies.
First, and in the short run, the government can incentivize the small sized 
banks to consolidate with other small and medium sized banks through rewards. 
The government can grant special tax concessions for expenditure incurred by 
small sized banks if they merge or undergo an acquisition process with small 
and medium sized banks. This would trigger mergers and acquisitions among 
the small and medium sized banks unlike in the case of blind increases in the 
core capital requirements. The resulting large entities would be efficient due 
to economies of scale and scope. This would enable the resulting large entities 
pose substantial competition to large and other medium sized commercial banks 
and therefore, reduce exceptional bank profitability.
Second, and in the short run, the government can offer to cover the 
consolidation expenditures for small banks that merge with medium and small 
sized banks. The government can achieve this by setting up a technical committee 
including international and national consultants to provide free consultancy to 
small and medium sized commercial banks interested in merging or involved 
African Review of Economics and Finance  Vol 11 (1) 2019
248
in acquisitions. This would encourage small sized and medium sized banks 
interested in consolidation but derailed by consolidation costs to consolidate. 
The resulting large entities decisions would trigger strategic reactions from the 
large banks and therefore, increase rivalry and reduce exceptional profitability.
Third, and as a medium term measure, the government can spur consolidation 
among small sized and medium sized banks through a minimum market share 
policy. In Kenya, the market share of commercial banks is measured using the 
composite market share index. A bank with a CMSI of over five per cent is 
considered large, that with a CMSI between one per cent and five per cent is 
medium and those with a CMSI of less than one per cent are regarded as being 
small. The government can set a minimum CMSI index greater than one to trigger 
consolidation among small sized and medium sized banks. A legal requirement 
of CMSI greater than one would create a mutual interest among small sized 
and some medium sized commercial banks to merge. The market share policy 
would not trigger consolidation motives among large sized banks since they 
already satisfy the requirement. The resulting large commercial banks would be 
large enough to matter in all forms of competition and therefore, reduction of 
exceptional profitability.
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